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CASENOTES

Michigan Department of State Police v.

Sitz: Suspicionless Seizures and the
Fourth Amendment

The Court must not permit drunk drivers from making the
fourth amendment their latest casualty.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Drunk driving is of considerable national concern. 2 Consequently,
there has been a tremendous increase in public awareness of the drunk

4
driving problem. 3 In response to public pressure, Congress and state

legislatures5 have enacted legislation providing increasingly harsher
penalties for driving under the influence (DUI).
Local governments have likewise increased their efforts 6 and have
resorted to the use of roadblocks to determine if motorists are driving

1. Comment, DUI Roadblocks: Drunk Drivers Take A Toll On The Fourth
Amendment, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 983, 1005 (1984).
2. The Supreme Court cited the following statistics in its opinion: "Drunk
drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause
nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property
damage." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485-86 (1990).
But see infra notes 101-102.
3. Over the years, several political lobbying groups committed to eliminating
drunk driving have developed. See generally, DrivingDrunks Off the Road, Changing
Times, July 1982, at 50 (discussion of anti-drunk driving lobbying groups including
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD),
Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), and Citizens for Safe Drivers (CDS)).
4. In order to qualify for federal funds, Congress enacted a statute that
requires states to pass drunk driving laws that contain the following minimum criteria:(A) minimum license suspension of 90 days for first offenders and one year for
repeat offenders; (B) 48-hour mandatory jail sentence or 10 days community service;
(C) intoxication defined as blood alcohol content of .10 percent; and (D) increased
enforcement efforts and public awareness campaigns. See 23 U.S.C. sec. 408(e)(1)(1988).
5. For example, California permits the forfeiture or impoundment of a drunk
driver's vehicle. See CAL. VEH. CODE sec. 23195 (West 1985).
6. The traditional method of detecting and deterring drunk drivers is by roving
marked patrols acting on observed violations. See generally, Ekstrom v. Justice Ct.,
136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983).
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under the influence of alcohol. 7 However, because roadblocks subject
drivers to seizure' without probable cause or individualized suspicion,
their constitutionality under the fourth amendment is questioned. 9
In a case of first impression, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of DUI roadblocks in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz.' 0 Sitz examined whether a state's use of
highway sobriety checkpoints" violated the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.' 2 The Court held
that the initial stop of motorists passing through a sobriety checkpoint
and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers were reasonable seizures which did not violate the
3
fourth amendment.'
This Note will examine the validity of the Sitz decision under the
fourth amendment. The evolution of suspicionless seizure law will be
traced, followed by the history of Sitz and the Supreme Court's
decision upholding DUI roadblocks. After an in-depth analysis of the
Court's opinion, this Note will conclude with some thoughts about
the impact of allowing these suspicionless seizures. Contrary to the
decision in 'Sitz, this author believes that because methods exist to
advance the public interest without the seizure of innocent motorists,
7. Federal law lists the use of roadblocks to detect drunk drivers as a measure
a state is authorized to take in order to qualify for supplemental highway funds. See
23 C.F.R. sec. 1309.6 (11)(1990).
8. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a
"seizure" within the meaning of [the fourth amendment] even though the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Id. at 653. Accord
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (roadblock stop constitutes
a seizure).
9. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
11. The words "checkpoint"
throughout this Note.

and "roadblock"

are used interchangeably

12. The fourth amendment has been made applicable to the States through the

fourteenth amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled on
other grounds, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

13. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2483 (1990) rev'g
Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180 (1988).
But see infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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DUI roadblocks unduly interfere with the motorist's right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF SUSPICIONLESS SEIZURE LAW

Under the fourth amendment, the government can only conduct
searches and seizures that are reasonable. 14 The temporary stopping
of an automobile at a roadblock is a "seizure" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. 5 Therefore, roadblocks conducted for the
purpose of detecting and arresting drunk drivers are subject to the
6
fourth amendment standard of reasonableness.
As a general principle, the fourth amendment requires that
searches and seizures be carried out pursuant to a warrant supported
by probable cause. 17 Probable cause exists "if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence
and caution in believing that the offense has been committed" by the
individual who is the subject of the search or seizure.' Searches and
seizures occurring without a warrant supported by probable cause
19
have been held to be per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional. Nevertheless, a few "jealously guarded and carefully drawn"
exceptions do exist.30
The use of highways and streets by motor vehicles may be
controlled and regulated to the extent necessary to promote safety
and general welfare. 21 Consequently, the warrantless searches and
14. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
15. See supra note 8.

16. The essential purpose of the reasonableness requirement is to limit "the
exercise of discretion by government officials . . . in order to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979).
17. See supra note 9. See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959)

(probable cause requirement "has roots that are deep in our history"); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (probable cause requirement is best compromise between opposing fourth amendment interests). See generally Grano, Rethinking
the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. Cuem. L. REv. 603 (1982)

(analysis of warrant and probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment).
18. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).
19. Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) ("searches conducted ... without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment .....
20. Id. at 455.
21. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (reduced
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seizures at drunk driving roadblocks would seem to be permissible
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 22 This
exception permits a government agent to conduct a warrantless search
or seizure due to the reduced expectation of privacy and ready mobility
of automobiles.23 Only the warrant requirement, however, is dispensed
with under the automobile exception. The probable cause requirement
24
must still be met.
A very limited exception to the probable cause requirement was
created in Terry v. Ohio.25 Terry held that a police officer can seize
an individual when the officer is able to show "specific and articulable
facts" that, when combined with "rational inferences," lead to
reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed a crime. 26 The
probable cause requirement is therefore excused if the officer can
establish reasonable suspicion for seizing an individual. An officer
may further conduct a limited, warrantless search of the individual
for weapons if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the
27
individual is armed and dangerous.
The underlying rationale of Terry was that the state's interest in
crime prevention and officer protection outweighed the limited intrusion on an individual's fourth amendment interest. 28 Therefore, pursuant to Terry, a reasonable suspicion standard satisfies the fourth

amendment .29

The advent of suspicionless searches and seizures has created yet
another exception to the fourth amendment probable cause and
warrant requirements.3 0 In this context, the trend has been to employ

privacy in automobile due to pervasive governmental regulation of vehicle and "public
nature of automobile travel"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976) (expectation of privacy in automobile significantly different from traditional
expectation of privacy in residence).
22. See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 153-54 (holding that automobile searches must still be based upon
probable cause).
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
27. Id. at 25-26, 30.
28. See id. at 30-31.
29. Id. at 31. Another exception to the warrant requirement is the prevention
of destruction of evidence. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963).
30. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967) (authorizing
suspicionless administrative health and safety code inspections); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (authorizing suspicionless stops at permanent border patrol checkpoints); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
579, 592-93 (1983) (authorizing suspicionless customs inspections of documents aboard
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a balancing test in order to examine the reasonableness of a search

or seizure."

The constitutionality of suspicionless roadblock seizures has been
analyzed under the "neutral criteria" standard .32 This standard requires that the seizure "be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.""
To satisfy the neutral criteria standard, several factors must be
balanced. 34 First, the court must consider the gravity of the public
interest that the seizure seeks to serve." Second, the court must
36
consider whether the seizure advances that public interest. Finally,
the court must balance the severity of the interference with the
individual's liberty and privacy.3 7 Historically, upon balancing these
competing interests, the Supreme Court has found roadblock-type
3
seizures, absent individualized suspicion, to be reasonable.
The Supreme Court first ruled upon suspicionless searches and
seizures in Camara v. Municipal Court.3 9 In Camara, the inspection
oceangoing vessels); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 218-21 (1984) (allowing suspicionless INS immigration control workplace "surveys"); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (S.D. 1979) (authorizing suspicionless stops to enforce hunting and fishing laws); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d
897, 899-901 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding suspicionless search as condition to entering
state courthouse); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)
(upholding suspicionless searches and seizures by way of metal detector screenings of
airplane passengers and people entering certain public buildings).
31. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (The Brown balancing test
requires the "weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty."). See also infra notes 70-75 and accompanying
text.
32. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) ("[R]egulatory inspections
unaccompanied by any quantum of individualized, articulable suspicion must be
undertaken pursuant to previously specified 'neutral criteria."').
33. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
34. The reasonableness of such seizures is determined by balancing the importance of the public interest being pursued against "the individual's right to ...

[be]

free from arbitrary interference by law officers." See id. at 50.
35. Id. at 50-51.
36. Id. at 51.
37. See id. The Brown Court also stated that in weighing these factors care
must be taken so that "an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the
field." Id. at 51.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1976)
(court used balancing test in upholding suspicionless stops at a permanent immigration
checkpoint near the Mexican border).
39. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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of an apartment in order to discover housing violations was found by
the Court to be reasonable and therefore valid, despite the lack of
suspicion that any violations existed. ° Camara did not involve a
suspicionless search of a motorist. It is cited, however, for the
proposition that individualized suspicion is not a prerequisite to
41
constitutional seizures.
Prior to Sitz the United States Supreme Court had not addressed
the constitutionality of a sobriety roadblock. However, it had examined the validity of roadblocks under similar circumstances. 42 In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,43 a permanent immigration checkpoint was located on an interstate route near San Clemente. " All
traffic passing through the checkpoint was visually screened by a
Border Patrol agent in order to determine whether a further inquiry
was necessary.4 5 Vehicles requiring further inquiry were directed to a
secondary inspection area where the occupants were asked about their
6
citizenship and immigration status.4
The Martinez-FuerteCourt held that a brief stop and questioning
may be made at reasonably located checkpoints without advance
judicial authorization 47 and without any individualized suspicion 48 that

40. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 526-27 (1967). In finding the
search reasonable, the Court stressed that three factors justified the search: (1) the
suspicionless search in question was widely accepted by the public and the judiciary;
(2) the suspicionless search was not aimed at discovering criminal activity; and (3)
the suspicionless search was the only method available to adequately enforce the
housing code. Id. at 537. The Court did not indicate whether all three factors were
essential or what weight was allocated to each.
41. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976).
42. See generally, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(roadblock designed to interdict illegal alien traffic is constitutional); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (finding stops for license checks without reasonable
suspicion by roving patrols unconstitutional, but suggesting that roadblocks are a
viable alternative).
43. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
44. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545. The purpose of the roadblock was to
detect and deter people from illegally entering the country from Mexico. Id. at 551.
45. Id. at 546. The majority of vehicles passed through the checkpoint "without
any oral inquiry or close visual examination." Id.
46. Id. at 546. Respondents were defendants in three separate prosecutions
resulting from arrests made on three different occasions for illegally transporting
aliens.
47. Id. at 564-566. The Court cited several factors in holding that operation of
a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by a judicial warrant. First,
the visible manifestations of the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provided
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the particular vehicle contained illegal aliens. 49 The Court found that
immigration roadblocks were an effective means for detecting illegal
aliens.5 0 Moreover, because no less intrusive methods existed in order
were
to control the flow of illegal aliens, 1 the permanent roadblocks
2
essential to the total immigration enforcement scheme.1
assurances to motorists that the officers were acting lawfully. Second, the purpose
of a warrant in preventing hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure was inapplicable, since the reasonableness of checkpoint
stops turned on factors such as the checkpoint's location and method of operation.
These factors were not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, and would be open
to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Third, the purpose of
a warrant in substituting a magistrate's judgment for that of the officer was not
applicable, since the need for this was reduced because the decision to "seize" was
not entirely in the hands of the field officer and deference was to be given to the
administrative decisions of higher ranking officials in selecting the checkpoint locations. Id.
48. Id. at 563-564. The Court held it was constitutional to refer motorists
selectively to a secondary inspection area for limited inquiry on the basis of criteria
that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop, since the intrusion was sufficiently
minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it. However, Justice
Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, stated that
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully
in this country must know after today's decision that he travels the fixed
checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but
also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far
more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists.
Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 556-60. The Court's holding in Martinez-Fuerte deviated from
previous border patrol search and seizure cases. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-75 (1973) (requiring probable cause or consent to justify
random vehicle searches by a roving patrol); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
892-93 (1975) (extending the Almeida-Sanchez holding to vehicle searches at traffic
checkpoints); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (holding
that a roving-patrol stop is constitutional only if based on "specific articulable facts
...that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be
illegally in the country").
50. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). The San
Clemente checkpoint apprehended approximately 17,000 illegal aliens in 1973.
51. See id. at 556-67. According to the Court, a reasonable suspicion standard
would be impractical because the "flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow
particularized study." Id. at 557.
52. The only effective method for controlling the flow of illegal aliens involved
the combined use of permanent and temporary checkpoints with roving patrols. See
id. at 552-67. By locating the permanent roadblock on the main highway, the more
easily recognizable illegal aliens were forced onto the less heavily traveled roads,
where roving patrols could use a reasonable suspicion standard to detect them. Id.
at 557.
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When considering the individual's fourth amendment interest the
Court found that the roadblock caused only a minimal intrusion."
The Court explained that while the "objective intrusion" (the stop,
questioning and visual inspection) was the same as in a roving patrol
stop,5 4 the "subjective intrusion" (the generating of concern or even
fright) was not as great." This conclusion was based on the physical
characteristics 6 of a permanent checkpoint57 and also on the limited
nature of police discretion involved. 8 After determining that the
immigration roadblocks were both necessary to effectively reduce the
flow of illegal aliens and only minimally intrusive, the Court found
the suspicionless seizures to be reasonable.59
The second Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality
° In
of suspicionless vehicular seizures was Delaware v. Prouse.W
Prouse,
a local police officer randomly stopped a vehicle to check the driver's
license and vehicle registration. 6' The Court applied the traditional

53. See id. at 560.
54. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-82 (1975) (holding
a roving border patrol's suspicionless stop unreasonable).
55. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
56. Essential to the holding were the procedures used by the border patrol
officers at the fixed checkpoints, such as large signs and flashing lights warning
motorists of the checkpoints. Id. at 545-47.
The Court stated that the reasonableness of the procedures followed in making
these stops minimized the resulting intrusion on the interests of the motorists. Id.
57. Id. at 559. Emphasizing its permanent nature, the Court stated that,
"[m]otorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may
obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped
elsewhere." Id.
58. Id. at 559. The Court emphasized that checkpoint operations involve less
discretionary law enforcement activity where the regularized operation serves to
reassure motorists of the authorized nature of such stops and where the location of
fixed checkpoints are determined, not by field officers, but by higher ranking officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
resources. Id. at 559.
59. Id. at 562. The Court went on to limit the extent of its holding by stating
that, "our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in this opinion."
Id. at 567. However, the Court observed in a footnote that stops at a permanent
border checkpoint were not dissimilar from those widely used at the state and local
levels to enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits,
and other similar matters, and stated that it would intimate no view respecting such
stops other than to note that the "practice of stopping automobiles briefly for
questioning has a long history evidencing its utility and is accepted by motorists as
incident to highway use." Id. at 560-61 n.14.
60. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
61. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979).
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fourth amendment balancing test 62 and found that the random stop
63
violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The Court noted

that the state had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the drivers on

its highways were qualified and that vehicles were maintained in safe

operating conditions. 64 The Court concluded, however, that absent
some empirical basis showing effectiveness, 65 the random stopping of
vehicles for license checks did not outweigh the resulting intrusion
66
upon an individual's right of freedom from police interference.

Nevertheless, the Court stated, in dictum, that its decision did
not preclude the use of less intrusive means to effect the state interest67
in checking licenses, such as stopping all traffic at a roadblock.
Consequently, Prouse has been cited to support the constitutionality
of DUI roadblock seizures.

The Prouse Court held that the constitutionality of suspicionless
'6 The
roadblock stops depended on adherence to "neutral criteria."

Court did not, however, set forth a clear test for when the neutral
62. The permissibility of random stops was judged by "balancing its intrusion
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." Id. at 654.
63. Id. at 663.
[Eixcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is
not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject
to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the
driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the
automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.

64. Id. at 658.
65. Id. at 659. The Court stated that the contribution to highway safety made
by discretionary stops selected from among drivers would be marginal at best. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the lack of empirical evidence
supporting such stops. Id. at 659-61.
66. The Court stated that stopping vehicles upon observed violations would be
a more effective and less intrusive alternative to such suspicionless stops. Id.
67. "This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve
the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id. at 663.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, stated that less intrusive spot checks
"that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion" necessarily includes
other not purely random stops such as every 10th car. Id. at 664 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
68. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text

for one explanation of the neutral criteria standard.
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criteria standard was to be applied. 69 It was not until Brown v. Texas
that the Supreme Court defined what "neutral criteria" entailed. 0 In

Brown, the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute which allowed
police to detain and require a person to identify himself even though

the officer had no probable cause to believe the person was engaged
in or had been engaged in criminal conduct. 71 In analyzing the

reasonableness of the seizure, the Court refined the balancing test by

weighing not only the gravity of public interest in the seizure and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty, but also the degree

to which the seizure advanced the public interest. 7 The Court was
primarily concerned that an individual's reasonable expectation of

privacy was not subject to arbitrary and discretionary police inva-

sions.73 The Court held that protection of an individual's fourth
amendment privacy rights required that the seizure either be based on

individualized reasonable suspicion,74 or "carried out pursuant to a
plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of indi75
vidual officers."
These Supreme Court decisions indicate that police need not base

a roadblock seizure on probable cause or reasonable suspicion. All

that is primarily required is that the roadblock is operated pursuant
to procedures which limit the police officer's discretion.76
69. See generally, Comment, Filling in the Blanks After Prouse: A New
Standard for the Drinking-Driving Roadblock, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 241 (1985).

70. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (Seizures are constitutional if "carried out pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual
officers.").
71. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979). In Brown, police officers
observed two males walking away from one another in an alley. One officer stopped
the defendant because he "looked suspicious" and because the area where the stop
occurred had a high incidence of drug traffic. When the defendant refused, in
violation of state law, to give the officer his name and address, he was arrested. Id.
at 48-49.
72. See id. at 50-51.
73. See id.

74. See id. Seizures absent probable cause must satisfy the Terry standard of
reasonable suspicion, which requires "specific and articulable facts," that, when
combined with "rational inferences," leads to reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968). See also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.

75. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). Such limitations include the

questioning of all on-coming traffic, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979),

and roadside truck weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, Prouse, 440 U.S. at
663 n.26. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n. 14 (1976).

76. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559-60 (1976) (validating roadblock operated according to reasonable guidelines); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
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MICHIGAN V. SITZ

APPLYING THE PRECEDENT: MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICE V. SITZ

HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Michigan Department of State Police established a sobriety
checkpoint program under guidelines drafted by a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee."' The checkpoints would be established at
certain sites along state highways where all motorists would be stopped
and examined for signs of intoxication.7 8 If the officer concluded the
driver was not intoxicated, the driver would be released. However,

should the officer find indications of intoxication 79 the officer would

direct the driver to an out-of-traffic location where the driver's license

and registration would be checked, further sobriety tests conducted,
and if warranted, an arrest would be made.
The first sobriety checkpoint was in operation from approximately 11:45 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. Of the 126 vehicles which passed
through the checkpoint during that time, two drivers were retained
for sobriety field tests.8 0 One of those drivers was arrested for driving
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (suggesting that roadblock stopping vehicles in systematic fashion
is constitutionally valid); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (recognizing an
"individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers.").
77. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 435-36, 429
N.W.2d 180, 181 (1988). Such guidelines included: "site selection, publicity, and
operation of the checkpoint, including briefing, scheduling, safety considerations,
motorist contact, staffing and assignment of duties." Id. at 436, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
The committee was composed of representatives of the State Police, local law
enforcement officials, prosecuting attorneys, and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. Id. at 436, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
78. Id. at 426, 429 N.W.2d at 181. Each checkpoint operation site was to be
selected by the Michigan Accident Location Index (MALI) computer, pinpointing
every accident based upon intersecting roadways. MALI considered the driver, day
of the week, the time, the weather, and any circumstances involving drinking. Brief
for Petitioner at 8, Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 429
N.W.2d 180 (1988) (No. 88-1897).
Although the exact time and location of the sobriety checkpoint would not be
made public in advance, the use of such checkpoints was to be made public through
local media prior to the checkpoint operation so as to enhance the deterrent effect
among drunk drivers. Id.
79. Outward signs of intoxication include watery, bloodshot eyes and breath
that smells of alcohol. See e.g., State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 531, 673 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1983) (motorist smelled of alcohol and had watery, bloodshot eyes); State v.
Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 580, 427 A.2d 131, 133 (1980) (motorist had bloodshot
eyes and odor of alcohol on his breath).
80. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180,
181 (1988).
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while under the influence of alcohol."' The average delay to motorists
2
was twenty-five seconds or less.1

Sitz commenced an action against the Michigan Department of
State Police and its director seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from potential subjection to the checkpoint." Sitz alleged the roadblocks violated rights secured by both the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution 4 and Article I, sec. 11, of the Michigan
Constitution.85

The trial court entered judgment for Sitz and found the checkpoint procedure unconstitutional. 6 Applying the Brown balancing
test, the trial court concluded that "although there was a grave and
legitimate state interest in curbing drunk driving, 7 the sobriety checkpoint program did not significantly further the public interest 8 ...
81. Id. at 436, 429 N.W.2d at 181. A third driver who drove through the
checkpoint without stopping was pulled over by an officer and arrested for driving
under the influence. Id. at 436-37, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
82. Id. at 436, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
83. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2484 (1990). The
six respondents "are licensed drivers of the State of Michigan who regularly travel
throughout the state in their automobile." Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170
Mich. App. 433, 437, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1988). Each respondent will be collectively
referred to throughout this Note as Sitz. Pending the outcome of the litigation, the
director and the Michigan Department of State Police agreed to delay further
implementation of the checkpoint program. Id. at 437, 429 N.W.2d at 181.
84. See supra note 9.
85. Art. 1, sec. 11 of the Michigan Constitution provides in relevant part:
"The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place
or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
MICH. Co sT., Art. 1, sec. 11 (1963).
Although this Note will focus solely upon the fourth amendment violation, the
court of appeals held that the checkpoint also violated the state constitution because
it "offer[ed] at least the same protection as accorded by the fourth amendment."
Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 443, 445, 429 N.W.2d 180, 185
(1988).
86. Id. at 445, 429 N.W.2d at 184-85.
87. Id. at 439, 429 N.W.2d at 183. "Evidence presented at trial indicated that
alcohol was a contributing factor in about twenty-five to fifty percent of motor
vehicle fatalities." Id. at 440, 429 N.W.2d at 183. See also supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Brown balancing test.
88. Id. at 439, 429 N.W.2d at 183-85.
In concluding that sobriety checkpoints were not an effective means of
combating drunk driving, the trial court found: (1) the degree to which a
sobriety checkpoint program would deter drunk driving was directly related
to the program's success in achieving actual arrests; (2) sobriety checkpoints
were not an effective means of actually apprehending drunk drivers; and (3)
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and subjectively intruded on individual liberties." 8 9 The Michigan
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed 9° and the Michigan Supreme
Court denied the state police department's application for leave to
appeal. In response to the lack of state court consensus regarding the
constitutionality of DUI roadblock seizures, 9' the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the constitutionality of
92
DUI roadblocks.
B. THE DECISION

The Court began its analysis by holding that the initial stop of

each motorist passing through the checkpoint and the associated

the statistical data and testimony presented at trial demonstrated, at most,
a short- term deterrent effect.
Id. at 440, 429 N.W.2d at 183.
89. Id. at 439, 429 N.W.2d at 183. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
focused upon two factors: "(1) the potential of the checkpoints to generate fear and
surprise to motorists, and (2) the degree of discretion left to individual officers." Id.
at 444, 429 N.W.2d at 184.
90. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 441, 429 N.W.2d
at 184 (1988) (finding that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous).
91. Several state courts have upheld the constitutionality of DUI roadblock
seizures: Arizona-State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 49, 691 P.2d 1073, 1077
(1984)(en banc); Georgia-State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 29-30, 318 S.E.2d 693,
695 (1984); Illinois-People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 292-93, 486 N.E.2d 880, 889
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986); Indiana-State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158,
163 (Ind. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); Kansas-State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 541-42, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); Kentucky-Kinslow v. Commonwealth,
660 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984);
Maryland-Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504, 479 A.2d 903, 912 (1984); New JerseyState v. Coccomo, 177 N.J.Super. 575, 583-84, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1980); New York-People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 529, 473 N.E.2d 1, 6,
483 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1984); People v. Torres, 125 Misc. 2d 78, 82-83, 478 N.Y.S.2d
771, 775 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984); People v. Peil, 122 Misc. 2d 617, 621, 471 N.Y.S.2d
532, 535 (N.Y.Just.Ct. 1984); Oregon-State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134, 138-39,
647 P.2d 959, 962 (1982); South Dakota-State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 725
(S.D. 1979).
A number of state courts, however, have found DUI roadblock seizures to be
unconstitutional: Arizona-Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992,
996 (1983) (en banc); Florida-Jones v. State, 459 So. 2d 1068, 1078-79 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137,
144, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983); New Hamphire-State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286,
293-95, 499 A.2d 977, 982-83 (1985); New Jersey-State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28,
36-37, 493 A.2d 1271, 1275 (App. Div. 1985); North Dakota-State v. Goehring, 374
N.W.2d,882, 888 (N.D. 1985); Oklahoma-State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 565 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984); South Dakota-State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 (S.D.

1976); Washington-State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 441, 706 P.2d 225, 228

(1985).

92. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 11

preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers constituted a seizure under the fourth amendment. 93
Therefore, the focus turned to the "reasonableness" of the seizure. 94
In analyzing the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint plan,
respondents argued that the balancing test derived from Brown v.
Texas 5 was not the proper method of analysis. 96 Respondents maintained that the constitutionality of such checkpoints should have
proceeded from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
and that before a balancing analysis was appropriate a "special
governmental need, 'beyond the normal need' for criminal law enforcement," must be shown. 97 They argued that sobriety roadblocks
are performed for the sole purpose of enforcing criminal laws prohibiting drunken driving and therefore no "special governmental need"
existed. 9 The Court dismissed this argument, holding that prior
decisions concerning police stops of motorists on public highways
utilized a balancing analysis. 99 Therefore, Brown was the relevant
authority. ,00
The Court began its Brown analysis by focusing upon the State's
interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers. After reviewing statistical evidence' 0 the Court held that "no one can seriously
93. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2485. The Court noted that further detention of particular
motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an
individualized suspicion standard. The instant action, however, challenged only the
use of sobriety checkpoints generally, focusing solely upon the initial stop.
94. See supra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
95. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979). See also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying
text.
96. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that "the Brown
three-prong balancing test was the correct test to be used to determine the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint plan." Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170
Mich. App. 433, 436, 429 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1988).
97. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990)
(quoting National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
Respondents relied upon the prior decision of Von Raab wherein the Court stated:
"Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the
individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context."
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 665-66 (1989)).
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) and Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 653 (1979).
100. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
101. See supra note 2 for the statistical evidence relied upon by the Sitz Court.
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dispute the magnitude of the drunk driving problem or the States'

interest in eradicating

it.°102

Next, the Court balanced the level of intrusion on an individual's
privacy caused by the checkpoints. Although agreeing with the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the "objective" intrusion on
motorists was minimal,103 the Supreme Court rejected the lower courts'
findings that the "subjective" intrusion was substantial.I°4
In evaluating the degree of "subjective" intrusion, the Court
held that the "fear and surprise" to be considered was "the fear...
engendered in law abiding motorists by the nature of the stop;" not
the "natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of
being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint . . . ."0 As such, the Court
compared checkpoint stops to the roving patrol stops considered in
prior cases,°6 and found that the subjective intrusion was appreciably
less in the case of a checkpoint stop. 0 7

Attacking the statistics cited by the Court, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting
opinion, stated it was "inappropriate for the Court to exaggerate that concern by
relying on an outdated statistic from a tertiary source." Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2494 n.7
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
However, Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the Court's
comments on the dangers posed by drunk drivers, and stated that "for the period
from 1900 through 1969 motor-vehicle deaths [caused by drunken driving] in the
United States exceeded the death toll of all our wars." Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2488
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens attacked Justice Blackmun's statistics, stating that the number
of highway fatalities has declined significantly despite the increase in highway usage.
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2494 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, cited several recent statistics
evidencing a reduction in alcohol-related accidents in support of his position that
holding suspicionless seizures unconstitutional would not impede the law enforcement
community's remarkable progress in reducing the death toll on our highways. Id. at
2490-2491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990). The
"objective" intrusion was measured by the duration of the seizure (25 seconds) and
the intensity of the investigation. Id.
104. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed "the trial court's finding that the
guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize[d] the discretion of the officers
.... " However, the checkpoints were held unreasonable due to the potential to
generate fear and surprise in motorists, in that "'motorists would [not] be aware of
their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the checkpoints." Id.
105. Id. However, as Justice Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion, "[tihese
fears are not, as the Court would have it, solely the lot of the guilty .... To be law
abiding is not necessarily to be spotless, and even the most virtuous can be unlucky."
Id. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486-87 (1990).
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In the checkpoints at issue, uniformed police officers stopped

every vehicle. 0 s The subjective intrusion thus resulting from the stop

was indistinguishable from the stops previously upheld in Martinez-

Fuerte.109

Finally, the Court considered the degree to which the seizure

advanced the public interest, or the "effectiveness" of the proposed
checkpoint program." l0 When analyzing the "effectiveness" of the
procedures used, the Court held that the "choice among reasonable
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public resources . . . ."I" The procedures governing the roadblock would thus
be implemented by elected government officials accountable to the
public and not by the police officers in the field.

Furthermore, in rejecting the finding by the Court of Appeals
that sobriety checkpoints were not an effective means of combating
drunk driving," 2 the Supreme Court held that the lower court had
mistakenly relied upon Prouse and Martinez-Fuerte in its "effective-

'[Tihe circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less
intrusive than those attending a roving patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten
motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is
much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.'
Id. (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2487.

109. Id. at 2487. Note that Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, stated
that the Court's reliance upon Martinez-Fuertewas unavailing. The reason justifying
suspicionless stops in Martinez-Fuerte, namely that heavy flow of traffic would
hamper detection, was not present under the instant case. Id. at 2489 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of MartinezFuerte.
Likewise, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, distinguished MartinezFuerte from the instant case in three aspects: (1) the element of surprise is more
prevalent with a DUI checkpoint due to the "extremely broad discretion [of the
officers] in determining the exact timing and placement of the roadblock"; (2) the
lack of standardization in searching for evidence of intoxication, as compared to a
check for a driver's license or identification papers, evidences a significant difference
between the kind of discretion that the officer exercises after the stop is made; and
(3) "permanent checkpoints occur during daylight hours, whereas the sobriety checkpoints are ...

operated at night."

Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2492-2493 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
110. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
111. Id. at 2487.
112. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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ness" review."' In Prouse, the Court observed that random stops
involved the "kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion [which]
is the evil the Court ha[d] discerned . .

.

. ""1i Sitz, however, did not

involve a challenge to random stops." 5
Additionally, the Prouse Court focused on the absence of empirical data indicating the stops would be an effective means of promoting roadway safety." 6 During the operation of the roadblock challenged
in Sitz, approximately 1.5 percent of the drivers passing through the
roadblock were arrested for alcohol impairment." 7 Thus, some empirical evidence did exist as to its effectiveness. By way of comparison,
the Sitz court stated that the record in Martinez-Fuerte showed that
illegal aliens were found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing
through the checkpoint;"' yet the checkpoint was determined "effective."" 9 On this basis the Court in Sitz held the advancement of the
20
state's interest in preventing drunk driving was sufficiently shown.
In conclusion, the Court found the sobriety checkpoints consistent with the fourth amendment, in that the State's interest in preventing drunk driving and the checkpoints' advancement of that
interest outweighed the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists. 121

113. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2486-87 (1990).
See Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 442, 429 N.W.2d 180,
183 (1988) (The court of appeals noted that the ability of a particular law enforcement
technique to effectuate actual arrests was deemed a relevant factor by the United
States Supreme Court in its analyses in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660 (1979)
and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
114. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
115. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2487.
116. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659-60.
117. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990). In
addition, expert testimony offered at trial demonstrated that, "on the whole, sobriety
checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around 1 percent of all motorists
stopped." Id. at 2488.
118. Id. at 2488.
119. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
120. However, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "The
Michigan Police do not rely, as the Court does, on the arrest rate at sobriety
checkpoints to justify the stops made there." Rather, the state "maintained that the
mere threat of such arrests is sufficient to deter drunk driving ...." Michigan Dep't

of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2495-96 (1990) (emphasis in original) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2488. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, stated that "without
proof that the police cannot develop individualized suspicion that a person is driving
while impaired by alcohol, I believe the constitutional balance must be struck in
favor of protecting the public against even the 'minimally intrusive' seizures involved
in this case." Id. at 2490 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

In upholding the constitutionality of sobriety roadblocks, the
Court primarily relied upon Martinez-Fuerte.122 Several significant
differences exist, however, between DUI roadblocks and the immigration checkpoint involved in Martinez-Fuertewhich should have altered
the Court's analysis.
First, driving under the influence is a visible offense which can
be detected through less intrusive enforcement methods. An obviously
less intrusive mechanism would be the traditional observational method
in which the officer observes signs of intoxication to establish individualized suspicion. 21 In Martinez-Fuerte, however, the governmental
or public interest could not have been adequately protected if individual suspicion had been required.12 4 Drunk driving, unlike smuggling,
2 5
may be detected absent any checkpoints.
Second, DUI roadblocks involve a greater level of intrusion upon
an individual's fourth amendment rights than the immigration checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. Sobriety roadblocks are objectively
more intrusive because the officer, in investigating for signs of intoxication, focuses on the mannerisms of the driver. The smelling of
breath and judging of speech are much more intrusive than determining one's immigration status which does not require such close visual
inspection.
Additionally, DUI checkpoints are subjectively more intrusive
because the very nature of the stop itself generates more fear and
122. Note that the Court in Martinez-Fuerteexpressly limited its holding to the
type of permanent checkpoint presented in that case. United States v. Martinez-

Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976). See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Martinez-Fuerte.

123. Such signs include: excessive or inconsistent speeds, swerving, lane hopping,
disregarding traffic signs or signals, or the failure to use lights. See Note, Exploring
the Constitutional Limits of Suspicionless Seizures: The Use of Roadblocks to
Apprehend Drunken Drivers, 71 IOWA L. REv. 577, 589 n.91 (1986).
124. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557 (to require reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because the traffic flow was too heavy to allow "particularized study").
See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) in which the Court stated in
dictum that the absence of observable conduct that could provide a basis for
individualized suspicion of license and registration violations warranted the possible
use of roadblocks.
125. "A program that produces thousands of otherwise impossible arrests is not
a relevant precedent for a program that produces only a handful of arrests which
would be more easily obtained without resort to suspicionless seizures of hundreds
of innocent citizens." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2497
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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surprise in the motorist. 26 Not only are sobriety checkpoints conducted at night, but in constantly changing locations.127 Consequently,
the border search in Martinez-Fuerte, or any search at a permanent
and fixed checkpoint, is much less intrusive than the DUI roadblocks
upheld in Sitz. 28 Moreover, because the roadblock is aimed at the
'discovery :of evidence of a crime, the perceived purpose of the
roadblock will influence the degree of anxiety the seized individual
29

experiences.
In evaluating the subjective intrusion caused by DUI roadblocks,
the Court was misplaced in its reasoning that the only "fear and
surprise" to be considered was that engendered by law-abiding motorists. 3 0 Because a roadblock may be tolerable to some individuals,
whether law-abiding or not, does not assure its consistency with fourth

amendment guarantees.
Finally, the failure of the courts to confront the issues concerning
possible further detention has left many questions unanswered.'

126. With respect to sobriety roadblocks,"surprise is crucial to its method." Id.
at 2490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Note that the Martinez-FuerteCourt expressly stated that its holding was
"confined to permanent checkpoints." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 566, n.19 (1976).
128. "A motorist with advance notice of the location of a permanent checkpoint
has an opportunity to avoid the search entirely, or at least to prepare for, and limit,
the intrusion on her privacy." Sitz, 110 S.Ct. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. As Justice Stevens stated: "[A driver] may infer .

.

. that the police have

made a discretionary decision to focus their law enforcement efforts upon her .. .
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Some states have indicated that a drunk driving roadblock
stop should be upheld if its purpose is to remove drunk drivers from the road, but
invalidated if its purpose is to impose criminal penalties. See Ekstrom v. Justice
Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 10, 663 P.2d 992, 1001 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring) ("fourth
amendment would allow properly planned and operated roadblocks established for
deterrent rather than investigative or apprehension purposes"); cf. State v. Smith,
674 P.2d 562, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (in holding that fourth amendment was
violated by sobriety checkpoint investigations "for the purpose of seeking out criminal
DUI offenders," court stressed that the critical distinction from Martinez-Fuertewas
that the illegal alien checkpoints were not primarily seeking out criminals).
130. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2486 (1990).

131. See Comment, The Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to Sobriety Check-

points, 20 IDAHo L. REv. 127, 145-146 (1984):
Should one be required to step out of his car only if there is articulable and
reasonable suspicion that he is intoxicated, or is it a reasonable seizure under
the fourth amendment to require each motorist to leave his vehicle in order
to judge the manner of his walk? Should some drivers be required to exit
their cars while others are allowed to remain, or does Prouse'sconcern over
the unbridled discretion of the field officer dictate that all motorists be
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Police must rely upon their subjective perceptions in determining
whether a driver is intoxicated. 3 2 A motorist detained for further
examination will usually be required to perform field sobriety and
coordination tests.' Compared to the "routine and limited inquiry
into residence status" allowed by the Martinez-Fuerte Court, the
34
sobriety tests conducted at DUI roadblocks are much more intrusive.'
At a DUI roadblock, an officer's determination of the driver's sobriety
is not only objectively intrusive but inherently discretionary.
Advocates of sobriety checkpoints assert that the deterrent effect
generated by the use of roadblocks is enough to justify their use.' 35
The argument is that drunk drivers are deterred by the perception of
a concentrated police presence. Studies show, however, that roadblocks are not a useful deterrence tool and any deterrent effect is at
best inconclusive.' 3 6 The lack of demonstrable evidence that roadblocks are more effective thus supports the idea that the observational
method is as good, if not better in both apprehending and deterring
drunk drivers.' 37
Assuming, arguendo, that DUI roadblocks are an effective deterrent, the state must demonstrate increased effectiveness in drunk
treated equally? Are the observation of eye movements and smelling of
breath reasonable at a sobriety checkpoint? If so, what of the recalcitrant
driver who refuses to roll his window beyond the few inches necessary to
be audible? These critical questions are unique to a sobriety checkpoint.
132. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("officer who questions a
motorist at a sobriety checkpoint has virtually unlimited discretion to detain the
driver on the basis of the slightest suspicion").
133. See Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 491, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984). These tests
include "walking a straight line, touching the fingers to the nose, standing on one
foot and reciting the alphabet." Id. at 491 n.2, 479 A.2d at 906 n.2.
134. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
135. See Jacobs and Strossen, Mass Investigation Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving Roadblocks, 18 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 595, 597 (1985).
136. Id. at 638-45 (authors review substantial amounts of data regarding the
effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints and determine that results are inconclusive).
137. Several state courts finding DUI roadblocks unconstitutional expressly
mentioned the lack of empirical evidence offered by the state in demonstrating that
DUI roadblocks are more effective than the observational method. See cases cited
supra note 91.
Additionally, testimony that sobriety roadblocks were not an effective tool in
fighting drunken driving was reiterated by three witnesses in the Sitz trial court, each
of whom was a county sheriff in Michigan. All three sheriffs agreed that roving
patrols would be a more effective use of valuable resources than conducting a
roadblock. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 442-43, 429
N.W.2d 180, 184 (1988).
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driving arrests. However, as more motorists are deterred, fewer
roadblock arrests will be made, thus diminishing the statistical basis
for justifying DUI roadblocks.' 3 8 Presuming the state can prove a
decrease in arrests, studies show it is merely short term, and the
previous drunk driving levels rapidly reappear.3 9 The effect of roadblocks will diminish as drivers learn where roadblocks are likely to be
located and realize that the arrest rate is low. Thus, roadblocks seem
14
to be justified only under a short term deterrence rationale.
It is true that motorists have a reduced expectation of privacy in
their vehicles.' 4 ' However, it is of fundamental significance that the
fourth amendment protects people, not places. 142 As the Court noted
in Prouse, "people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection
when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are
they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into
43
their automobiles."
Motorists likewise retain an absolute right not to respond to
police questioning.'" Once a driver has complied with an officer's
request, he is not obliged to cooperate further. 45 However, given the
setting within which the questioning occurs, motorists will be reluctant
138. Note, Exploring the Constitutional Limits of Suspicionless Seizures: The
Use of Roadblocks to Apprehend Drunken Drivers, 71 IOWA L. REV. 577, 594 n. 119

(1986) (citing Campagne, Jr., The Constitutionality of Drunk Driver Roadblocks, 53

FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 24, 26 (1984)).
139. Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 441, 429 N.W.2d
180, 183 (1988).
140. Id. "The shock value of the checkpoint program may be its most effective
feature .... ." Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2498 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
143. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
144. This notion was established in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), as the "right to be let alone." See also Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) ("[A] person approached [by police].., need
not answer any question put to him; .

.

. [h]e may not be detained even momentarily

without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or
answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.") (citations omitted).
145. See Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 492, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) where the
court stated:
A motorist wishing to avoid a sobriety checkpoint may make a U-turn or
turn onto a side road prior to reaching the roadblock. No action is taken
against a driver doing so unless the motorist drives erratically ....

Likewise,

a driver who stops at the checkpoint but refuses to roll down the car window
is allowed to proceed.
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to assert their right not to cooperate given the consequences of such

noncooperation. 146

Supporters of DUI roadblocks point to the Prouse dictum 147 for
the proposition that suspicionless roadblock seizures are justified as
long as motorists are stopped en masse. It is rather peculiar, however,
that random detentions of only a few violate the fourth amendment,
but that such violations disappear as long as everyone is subjected to
the same stop. 14 It is questionable, however, whether the Prouse
Court intended to extend its dictum to apply to sobriety checkpoints
49
when the only mention of such stops occurs in a footnote.1
Finally, the fourth amendment specifically requires that searches
and seizures be carried out pursuant to a warrant supported by
probable cause. 150 Suspicionless searches and seizures do not fit into
any of the established exceptions to this requirement.' Furthermore,
the Court's use of the balancing test is subject to criticism because it

146. See Will, Is the ACLU Being Reasonable?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1983, at
80. In response to the characterization of roadblock intrusions as "minimal," one
lawyer commented: "If you refuse to stop or roll down your window or be properly
sheeplike, you'll discover how 'minimal' the police consider the matter. . . ." Id. at
80. See, e.g., Morgan v. Heidelberg, 246 Miss. 481, 489, 150 So. 2d 512, 515 (1963)
(court upheld as constitutional the stopping of the defendant after he approached a
roadblock set up to check drivers' licenses, turned around, and headed in the opposite
direction); State v. Hester, 245 N.J. Super. 75, 83, 584 A.2d 256, 260 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (state court upheld stop of motorist after he legally made a Uturn in order to avoid DUI roadblock because his license was revoked).
147. See supra note 67.
148. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664-65 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist questioned this peculiar logic in
his statement:
Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be "frightened" or "annoyed" when stopped en masse, a highway patrolman needs
neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all motorists on a
particular thoroughfare, but he cannot without articulable suspicion stop
less than all motorists. The Court thus elevates the adage "misery loves
company" to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 664.
149. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, n.18 (stating in dicta that questioning of all
oncoming traffic is a viable alternative). As one commentator concluded, "it is highly
unlikely that the Court would elect to dispose of an issue of such crucial national
interest by placing it in 'the body of a scarcely noticed footnote."' Comment, The
Prouse Dicta: From Random Stops to Sobriety Checkpoint, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 127,
145 (1984).
150. See supra note 9 for the definition of the fourth amendment.
151. See supra notes 22-29 for a discussion of the exceptions to the probable
cause and warrant requirements.
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has the effect of diminishing fundamental fourth amendment guar-

antees.112
D.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

Sustaining suspicionless seizures of motorists has serious implications. Once an automobile has been stopped, an officer has virtually
unlimited discretion to detain the driver.' 5 3 As a result of the detention,
an officer could compel the driver to produce a license or other
documents. 5 4 Should the driver open the car's glove compartment to
produce the documents, the officer could shine a flashlight into the
interior and seize any items in "plain view."' 5 5 The officer could
further compel the driver to get out of the car,' 5 6 and if there was
reasonable suspicion under the standards of Terry v.Ohio,' 57 the
officer could frisk the driver. 5 s The potential for police abuse in a
checkpoint program is undeniable.5 9
Furthermore, sobriety roadblocks involve more than the mere
inconvenience of being stopped for one minute or less. Extensive use
of roadblocks create the possibility that an individual could encounter
a series of checkpoints within his travels, only to be repeatedly
subjected to the same intrusion over and over again.I 6 Roadblocks
152. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring):
'[Tihe [Fourth] Amendment does not leave the reasonable ness of most
[searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of
the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a [search]
is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable
cause.' Only in those exceptiona I circumstan ces in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcemen t, make the warrant and
probable cause requiremen t impractica ble, is a court entitled to substitute
its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (citations omitted).
153. "A ruddy complexion, an unbuttoned shirt, bloodshot eyes or a speech
impediment may suffice to prolong the detention." Michigan Dep't of State Police
v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2493 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
155. Id.
156. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam).
157. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
158. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (per curiam).
159. See generally, Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sitz
v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180 (1988) (No. 881897) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
160. Id.
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thus present the potential for a significant intrusion into the privacy

interests of law abiding citizens.
Suspicionless searches and seizures must be limited to situations
in which an important state interest could not be protected if individual suspicion was required. If not so limited, there is nothing to
prevent suspicionless searches and seizures to detect other crimes that
have traditionally required probable cause and reasonable suspicion.16'
Eventually, the result may be one in which "[e]ach step.. . appear[s]
a reasonable step in relation to that which preceeded it, although the
aggregate or end result [will be] one that would never have been
seriously considered in the first instance." 62
Regardless of the potential for abuse, the constitutionality of
DUI roadblocks has been upheld. In order to assure that the intrusion
upon motorists is minimal, the following safeguards must be met.
First, the initial stop of motorists, as well as any further detention,
must be entirely objective with limited police discretion.' 63 Second,
the intrusion must be confined to momentary stops accompanied by
a cursory visual examination. 64 Third, limitations must be imposed
to assure that the checkpoints' operations reduce to a minimal level
such subjective intrusions as surprise, confusion, and annoyance. 65
These safeguards should be viewed as essential to the constitutionality
of any checkpoint program.' 66
161. If roadblocks can be maintained to stop all persons, regardless of how
innocent their conduct, for the purpose of investigating or apprehending
drunk drivers, then presumably similar stops of all citizens could be undertaken for questioning and surveillance with regard to other crimes, such as
possession of narcotics, possession of stolen property or burglary.
Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983) (Feldman, J.,
concurring). See also State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Iowa 1980) (although
roadblock to investigate vandalism was held unconstitutional, the court stated such
roadblocks would be reasonable if properly implemented); People v. John B.B., 56
N.Y.2d 482, 489, 438 N.E.2d 864, 867, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (1982) (upholding the
constitutionality of roadblock seizure to obtain information regarding a series of
burglaries), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1010 (1982).
162. United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973).
163. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979).
164. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (upholding
border patrol auto checkpoint stop involving "only a brief detention").
165. See generally State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 541, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185
(1983) (listing numerous factors that will be examined in evaluating intrusiveness of
a checkpoint).
166. The National Transportation Safety Board has described the basic features
of the typical drunk driving roadblock:
(1) Police agencies select the times of operation and locations of checkpoints,
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Sitz held that sobriety roadblocks can be maintained to stop all
persons, regardless of how innocent their conduct, for the purpose of
investigating or apprehending drunk drivers. Given the demand for
more effective enforcement of drunk driving laws, it is not surprising
that law enforcement officials have turned to methods such as DUI
roadblocks.
Roadblocks, however, are not an effective means of addressing
the drunk driving problem. First, Driving Under the Influence is a
visible offense which can be detected through less intrusive enforcement methods. The lack of demonstrable evidence regarding the
effectiveness of DUI roadblocks supports the idea that the observational method is as good, if not better, at detecting the intoxicated
motorist and obtaining arrests. 67 Likewise, sobriety roadblocks are
ineffective in deterring drunk driving, precisely because they do not
1 68
lead to significant numbers of arrests.
Second, the manner in which a DUI roadblock operates is
subjectively intrusive. The element of surprise is prevalent with a DUI
based on empirical evidence of high DWI [driving while intoxicated] activity
or alcohol-related crashes.
(2) Checkpoint sites are established with high visibility, including warning signs, flashing lights, flares, police vehicles, and the presence of uniformed officers.
(3) Police officers conducting the checkpoint either stop all traffic or
use some preestablished, nonbiased formula to decide which vehicles to
stop; for example, every tenth vehicle.
(4) After being stopped, a motorist may be requested to produce a
driver's license or vehicle registration and is asked questions while the officer
looks for signs of alcohol impairment. In some cases where license/registration checks are not made, the stop is very brief (15 to 30 seconds).
(5) Based on his or her observations, the police officer either waves the
motorist on or directs him or her to a secondary area for further investigation. In the latter case, a roadside psychomotor test (e.g., walking a straight
line) or a breath-alcohol test is usually requested.
(6) If the driver fails these tests and the officer has probable cause, the
motorist is arrested for D[U]I.
(7) The arrested driver is then transported to the station for booking
and is requested to submit to an evidential breath-alcohol test. Refusal to
submit to such a test invokes the State's implied consent penalties.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,

SAFETY STUDY,

DETERRENCE OF DRUNK

DRIVING: THE ROLE OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE RE-

VOCATIONS

6 (1984).

167. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
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roadblock because it is conducted at night and for the purpose of
discovering evidence of a crime. Furthermore, DUI roadblocks are
inherently discretionary because a police officer has virtually unlimited
discretion in determining whether to subject an individual to further
detention.
It is not disputed that there exists a grave and legitimate state
interest in eliminating drunk driving. DUI roadblocks, however, do
not significantly further that interest. Although the severity of drunk
driving cannot be questioned, "the impairment of individual liberties
69
cannot be the means of making a point."'
JILL W. BRODERICK

169. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2499 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

